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81.
External spillovers, internal spillovers and the geography of production and innovation 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
We consider a three-location duopoly model such that (i) firms choose production and innovation locations before (Bertrand) competition takes place and (ii) there are internal and external knowledge spillovers. We show: (1) agglomerations where firms earn negative profits may exist when there are both external and internal knowledge spillovers; (2) greater external spillovers do not necessarily favor agglomeration; (3) decreasing communication costs tend to favor agglomeration; (4) there are exactly two types of agglomeration equilibria: either both firms innovate in the agglomeration, or there is an innovator and an imitator; and (5) if there is a location where both firms produce, then innovation must take place in this location. 相似文献
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Hans Gersbach 《Economics of Governance》2000,1(2):137-155
We examine the consequences when the public is unsure about the ability of governments to foresee the effects of decisions. Governments with much information should invest either immediately or never. Governments that are not well informed should wait for better information. But since governments want to signal their abilities to solve problems, we observe rash decisions and problems are portrayed as crises. We also show that excessive delay can occur. Delay or rush occur even if there is very little uncertainty about abilities of governments. We discuss three institutional rules to alleviate the rush and delay bias: Limiting expenditures before elections, experimental clauses or money burning. 相似文献
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Hkan J. Holm 《Games and Economic Behavior》2000,32(2):385
The subjects behaved significantly more “hawkish” in an experimental battle of the sexes game when the co-player was a woman compared to when it was a man. Discrimination helped the parties to coordinate and increase the average earnings in the subject group of mixed sex, compared to the unisex groups. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J7, C7, C9. 相似文献
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We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets by studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible. Standard banks can alleviate moral‐hazard problems, while financial markets operated by investment banks can alleviate adverse‐selection problems. In competition, standard banks are forced to increase repayments, since financial markets can attract the highest‐quality borrowers. This, in turn, increases the share of shirkers and may make lending unprofitable for standard banks. The coexistence of financial markets and standard banks is socially inefficient. The same inefficiency may occur with the entrance of sophisticated banks, operating with a combination of rating and ongoing monitoring technologies. 相似文献
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